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We investigate Bayesian and frequentist approaches to resonance searches using a toy model based on
an ATLAS search for the Higgs boson in the diphoton channel. We draw pseudo-data from the background
only model and background plus signal model at multiple luminosities, from 10−3/fb to 107/fb. We chart
the change in the Bayesian posterior of the background only model and the global p-value. We find that,
as anticipated, the posterior converges to certainty about the model as luminosity increases. The p-value,
on the other hand, randomly walks between 0 and 1 if the background only model is true, and otherwise
converges to 0. After briefly commenting on the frequentist properties of the posterior, we make a direct
comparison of the significances obtained in Bayesian and frequentist frameworks. We find that the well-
known look-elsewhere effect reduces local significances by about 1σ. We furthermore find that significances
from our Bayesian framework are typically about 1 – 2σ smaller than the global significances, though the
reduction depends on the prior, global significance and integrated luminosity. This suggests that even global
significances could significantly overstate the evidence against the background only model. We checked that
this effect — the Bayes effect — was robust with respect to fourteen choices of prior and investigated the
Jeffreys-Lindley paradox for three of them.
I. INTRODUCTION
Resonances are narrow peaks in the invariant mass dis-
tributions of pairs of particles detected in, for example, a
collider experiment. As a resonance originates from the on-
shell production and subsequent decay of a massive parti-
cle, a new resonance indicates the discovery of a new par-
ticle, as was the case in 2012 when the Higgs boson was
discovered [1, 2] at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC). New res-
onances typically lie above a background of events originat-
ing from well-understood physical processes. Unfortunately,
upwards statistical fluctuations in that background can, by
chance, imitate a resonance. Thus to discover a particle we
must distinguish fluctuations from genuine resonances.
The ATLAS and CMS experiments at the LHC use null hy-
pothesis significance testing to determine whether there is
a new resonance in an invariant mass distribution. This
methodology, reviewed in sec. III, invokes hypothetical
pseudo-experiments conducted with no resonance. If the
fraction of pseudo-experiments that would result in data at
least as extreme as that observed (the so-called p-value) lies
below a threshold, we reject the possibility that there is no
resonance, and possibly herald a discovery. In light of histori-
cal (see e.g., ref. [3]) and recent (see e.g., ref. [4]) criticism, we
recently advocated [5, 6] an alternative methodology based
on Bayes factors, reviewed in sec. IV. In this methodology,
we consider only the observed data, and directly compare
the plausibility of that data in a model with a resonance to
that in one without one. This allows us to calculate, amongst
other things, the posterior probability of the background
only model.1
In ref. [5] we considered the infamous 750GeV anomaly,
∗ Andrew.J.Fowlie@qq.com
1 As discussed further in sec. IV, we assume throughout that the background
and signal models are a priori equally plausible.
when ATLAS and CMS saw hints of a resonance in the in-
variant mass distribution of photons at 750GeV. This would
have been a historic discovery and it generated consider-
able activity (see e.g., ref. [7] for a review). Looking at ATLAS
data [8, 9], we found that whilst the p-value of about 0.02 ap-
peared suggestive, for our choices of priors the posterior of
the background model was in fact about 0.2. The anomaly
ultimately disappeared once more data was collected [10].
Similarly, in ref. [6], we considered a hint for a resonance in
the energy spectrum of electrons measured by the DAMPE
satellite [11]. The hint could be the first direct evidence for
dark matter. We again found that for our choices of priors
the posterior of the background, about 0.3, was significantly
greater than the p-value, about 0.01.
With these two cases in mind, in this work we compare the
behavior of the posterior of the background and the p-value
in resonance searches. In sec. II we present a toy example of
a resonance search based on one in which ATLAS discovered
the Higgs boson [12]. We review the frequentist and Bayesian
methods for analyzing this toy problem in sec. III and sec. IV,
respectively, and apply them to real and pseudo-data from
it in sec. V, showing how results change as the dataset grows
(see ref. [13] for a similar analysis in a different context), and
differences between the statistical approaches. Resonance
searches are tests of point null hypotheses. Historically, such
tests drew considerable attention and remain controversial
(see e.g., ref. [14–21]) due to the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox [14,
22].
We find in sec. V D that the posterior of the background
only model is typically orders of magnitude greater than the
p-value.2 This echoes criticisms that p-values overstate the
evidence for effects in other fields (see e.g., ref. [4, 24, 25]).
Despite arguments in e.g., ref. [26, 27] that such comparisons
2 Ref. [23] reaches a similar conclusion in an extremely crude analysis of
the Higgs discovery.
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2are akin to comparing heights and weights, we feel that a
comparison is justified as both the p-value (when interpreted
in the manner of Fisher; see sec. III) and posterior aim to an-
swer the same question: how strong is the evidence against
the null hypothesis? The fact that p-values markedly differ
from results of Bayesian methods does not, however, imply
that p-values are wrong.
We do not in this work address in detail further criticisms
of either methodology, e.g., the dependence of Bayes factors
on choices of prior (see e.g., ref. [28, 29]), though discuss prior
sensitivity of our findings in sec. VI and the Jeffreys-Lindley
paradox in sec. VII. We summarize our findings in sec. VIII.
II. TOY PROBLEM—ATLAS DIPHOTON SEARCH FOR A
HIGGS BOSON
We consider a historic ATLAS [12] search for a Higgs boson
in the diphoton channel at
p
s = 7TeV and ps = 8TeV with
25/fb of integrated luminosity; this search contributed to
the discovery of the Higgs boson in 2012. The inclusive ob-
served spectrum is shown in fig. 1. The spectrum (red points)
exhibits a suggestive resonance-like feature at 125GeV. We
consider two models for the data.
First, a background only model, M0, representing the back-
ground from known Standard Model (SM) processes other
than a Higgs boson. ATLAS model the background by a Bern-
stein polynomial. This introduces several unknown coeffi-
cients and an unknown normalization that governs the over-
all expected background yield. So that we can perform mil-
lions of fits, we fix the coefficients and normalization to their
best-fit values and thus omit all systematic uncertainties in
the background, including parametric uncertainties in the
Bernstein coefficients and uncertainties associated with that
particular choice of functional form.
Second, a background plus signal model, M1. This is the
background spectrum plus a narrow resonance, i.e., one with
a width, Γ, that is substantially narrower than the experi-
mental resolution of about 1.5GeV. We thus approximate
the width as zero, Γ ≈ 0. We know the expected amplitude
of a resonance from an SM-like Higgs boson. We choose to
model a Higgs-like signal with only two a priori unknown
parameters: the mass of the Higgs, mh , and the amplitude of
the signal relative to the SM, µ≥ 0.
The observed data is a set of counts, oi with i = 1,2, . . . ,30,
in each of 30 bins in diphoton invariant mass spanning
mγγ = 100 – 160GeV. We denote the expected number of
background events per bin by bi . In the signal model, the ex-
pected number of events is the sum of the expected number
of background events and signal events, si ,
λi = bi +µsi (mh). (1)
The expected signal is scaled by the signal strength, µ ≥ 0,
and itself depends on the Higgs mass by
si (mh)=σ×²×L ×
∫ mi+ 12∆m
mi− 12∆m
φ
(
mγγ;mh
)
dmγγ, (2)
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Figure 1: Diphoton spectrum observed by ATLAS [12] (red
points), predicted by the background only model (dashed
blue) and by the best-fitting signal model plus background
(solid yellow).
where mi is the bin center, ∆m ≡ 2GeV is the bin width,L =
25/fb is the integrated luminosity, σ is the total production
cross section, ² is the selection efficiency, and φ is the shape
of the signal. We model the shape by a Gaussian centered at
the Higgs mass, mh , with a width of 1.5GeV, governed by the
experimental resolution. We pick a Gaussian for simplicity;
ATLAS in fact use a modified Crystal Ball function. We found
σ×²' 22.3fb heuristically by reproducing the ATLAS result
at mh = 125GeV. The total background cross section, on the
other hand, was about 5700fb.
Thus the likelihood of the observed events is the product
of 30 Poisson likelihoods, one for each bin,
P (o |λ)=
30∏
i=1
e−λi λoii
oi !
, (3)
where λi and oi , are the expected and observed numbers
of events in bin i , respectively. We stress that this is a toy
treatment of the problem, intended to capture only the major
details, that omits e.g., systematic uncertainties or a detailed
treatment of the selection efficiency and cross section as
functions of the Higgs mass.
III. FREQUENTIST
In the frequentist framework, we construct a log likelihood
ratio test-statistic,
q ≡ 2ln
(
P
(
d
∣∣ µˆ,mˆh , M1)
P (d |M0)
)
, (4)
where d represents our experimental data and the hats in-
dicate the best-fitting value of a parameter. The best-fitting
signal strength cannot be negative, µˆ ≥ 0. Using the likeli-
3hood in eq. 3, we have that
P
(
d
∣∣µ,mh , M1)= P (o ∣∣λ= b+µs(mh)) , (5)
P (d |M0)= P (o |λ= b) . (6)
The frequentist quantities of interest are functions only of
q , which itself implicitly depends on µˆ and mˆh . To ensure
that no signals are missed, we find the best-fit mass and
signal strength inside every bin with an excess by Brent’s
method [30, 31], using (o−b)/s for that bin as a starting guess
for the signal strength. Lastly, we select the best-fit mass and
signal strength found from all the bins.
We use the test-statistic to calculate p-values with respect
to a null hypothesis, which in this work is always the back-
ground only model. The global p-value is the probability
of obtaining a test-statistic at least as extreme as that ob-
served for any value of the Higgs mass, assuming that the
background only model is true,
p-value= P (q ≥ qObserved ∣∣M0) . (7)
A local p-value, on the other hand, presupposes that we were
testing only a specific value of the Higgs mass. The p-value
is distributed as uniformly as possible under the background
only model [32]. Thus, if we reject the background model
only when the p-value lies below a threshold specified in
advance,
If p-value<α, reject M0, (8)
the threshold α is the type-1 error rate, i.e., the probability of
rejecting the background model when it is true. The p-value
itself though has no frequentist or Bayesian meaning: it is
not an error rate or the probability of the background only
model [33]. In high-energy physics, p-values are informally
interpreted in the manner of Fisher [34] as a continuous mea-
sure of evidence against the background only model, though
discoveries traditionally require a p-value below about 10−7,
corresponding to 5σ [35].3
To calculate p-values, we make use of two formulas that
are appropriate because our test-statistic is a log likelihood
ratio between nested hypotheses (the signal plus background
model contains the background model at µ = 0). For local
p-values, we use an asymptotic formula [37] based on Wilks’
theorem [38, 39]
Local p-value= 1−Φ(pq) , (9)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of a stan-
dard normal distribution. This presupposes that we were
testing only the best-fitting Higgs mass, mˆh . For global p-
values, we try a bootstrap technique: as discussed in sec. V
we ultimately perform 100 k pseudo-experiments at several
luminosities, repeating the minimization in eq. 4 each time.
We count the fraction of pseudo-experiments that result in a
3 See ref. [36] for a discussion of this hybrid interpretation.
test-statistic greater than or equal to that observed.4 If the
resulting global p-value lies below 0.001, we make use of the
Gross-Vitells technique [40], which should be more precise
than bootstrap in that regime,
p-value≈ 12 P
(
χ21 > q
)+Ne−q/2, (10)
where χ21 is a random variate from a chi-squared with one
degree of freedom and N is an a priori unknown parame-
ter.5 We determined N by counting the number of upcross-
ings of the test-statistic between 100GeV and 160GeV in
100 k Monte-Carlo (MC) simulations. Thus this formula ac-
counts for a one-dimensional look-elsewhere effect for the
Higgs mass in the range 100GeV to 160GeV.6 This was unac-
counted for by eq. 9 because the likelihood’s dependence on
the Higgs mass vanishes on the µ= 0 boundary, breaking an
assumption of Wilks’ theorem.
Finally, we convert p-values to Z-values, as is conventional,
using a one-tailed Gaussian rule,
Z =Φ−1(1−p). (11)
IV. BAYESIANMODEL COMPARISON
We consider the probability of the data in each model
— the so-called Bayesian evidence. For the signal model,
we must marginalize the a priori unknown Higgs mass and
signal strength,
P (d |M1)=
∫
P
(
d
∣∣mh ,µ)p (mh ,µ ∣∣M1) dmh dµ, (12)
where the second factor in the integrand is our choice of prior
density for the Higgs mass and signal strength. We perform
the integration by adaptive quadrature [30, 41], treating the
bin centers of the five bins with the most significant excesses
as special points. For the background model, it is trivial, as
there are no free parameters, so the evidence is given directly
by eq. 6.
Clearly, the evidence for the signal model depends upon
our choice of prior. For the mass, we focused on the narrow
range searched by ATLAS of 100GeV to 160GeV — although
choices that extend this range could reflect prior belief, they
4 In other words, we recycle our pseudo-experiments. First, we use them
to simulate the distribution of the test-statistic under the null hypothesis.
Second, we use them in our comparisons of Bayesian and frequentist
techniques.
5 Under the asymptotic conditions required by the Gross-Vitells method, N
doesn’t depend on the luminosity.
6 Note that ATLAS [1] corrected for look-elsewhere effects in the ranges
110 – 600GeV and 110 – 150GeV, whilst CMS [2] corrected for them in the
ranges 115 – 130GeV and 110 – 145GeV. The narrower ranges reflected
indirect constraints and exclusion limits from previous experiments and
mitigated edge effects at the boundaries of the data. We checked that edge
effects were absent by checking that the distribution of the log-likelihood
ratio matched the expected asymptotic result [37] at the boundaries. We
furthermore checked that narrowing the interval to 110 – 150GeV did not
qualitatively affect our results.
4would simply dilute the evidence for the signal model. Since
it did not span multiple decades, we picked a flat prior. For
the signal strength, we imagined a scenario in which we ex-
pected it to be somewhat close to the SM prediction of µ= 1,
though could deviate by a couple of orders of magnitude.
We supposed that we were ignorant of the magnitude of this
deviation and thus picked a prior that was flat in logarith-
mic space between 10−2 and 102. This prior does not favor
any particular order of magnitude, p
(
lnµ
)= const.; however,
the prior predictive for the best-fit signal strength could fa-
vor particular magnitudes depending on the likelihood. We
investigate several other choices of prior in sec. VI.
With the evidences, we calculate the Bayes factor (see e.g.,
ref. [28] for a review),
B10 = P (d
|M1)
P (d |M0)
. (13)
This is the impact of the data on the relative plausibility of
models M1 and M0. As the luminosity grows, we expect the
Bayes factor to increasingly favor the true model [42, 43]. To
facilitate a comparison with p-values, we find the posterior
of the background model,
Posterior of background≡ P (M0 |d)
= P (M0)
P (M0)+B10P (M1)
.
(14)
We can coherently incorporate relevant background infor-
mation in our choices of priors for the models, P (M0) and
P (M1). From hereon we assume that the models are a pri-
ori equally plausible, P (M0) = P (M1), though if we had a
reason for considering new physics relatively implausible,
we could choose P (M0)À P (M1). In this work we compute
posteriors to enable a comparison with p-values; however,
we usually advocate reporting only Bayes factors, since they
are independent of the priors for the models themselves.
We, furthermore, convert the posterior into a Z-value —
which we call the Bayesian significance — using the rule in
eq. 11. We do not advocate this in general and do so only
to communicate our results to particle physicists so used to
thinking of anomalies in terms of the number of sigmas.
There exists a bound on the rate at which we would be
misled by the posterior about the true model [44]. With two
models under consideration that are equally plausible a pri-
ori, if model M0 is correct, the chance that we find a posterior
for M0 that is less than a threshold t is bounded by
P (P (M0 |d)≤ t |M0)≤ t
1− t . (15)
The general bound depends on the number of models con-
sidered and the prior odds between the models.
For our toy problem, there exists a lower bound on the pos-
terior of the background obtainable with any priors for the
mass and signal strength (see ref. [45] and references therein
for further discussion of lower bounds on the posterior). The
posterior is minimized when the priors select the best-fitting
mass and strength, such that
P (M0 |d)= 1
1+eq/2 , (16)
where q is the test-statistic defined in eq. 4.
There are two major causes of discrepancies between pos-
teriors and p-values. First, the fact that the p-value considers
the probability that the test-statistic exceeds a threshold, i.e,
the probability of
E ≡ q ≥ qObserved, (17)
rather than the probability of obtaining the observed data
or observed test-statistic. To aid our comparisons between
Bayesian and frequentist procedures, we thus compute the
posterior of the background assuming this coarse-grained
information, i.e., we calculate
Coarse-grained posterior of background≡ P (M0 |E) . (18)
In the Bayesian context, conditioning upon E is strange as
we should condition upon all that we know, i.e., the observed
data itself. There is a gulf between knowing the data and
knowing only that the data was in the set E (see ref. [18] for
further discussion). This is useful though as if the models are
equally plausible a priori,
P (M0 |E)= p-value
p-value+P (E |M1)
, (19)
where P (E |M1) may be calculated using asymptotic formu-
lae developed for frequentist applications. When the p-value
is small, eq. 19 can be written as,
P (M0 |E)≈ p-value
1−P (q < qObserved ∣∣M1) . (20)
In this form it resembles CLs [46, 47] and Birnbaum’s mea-
sure of evidence in a binary experiment [48, 49]. Under the
signal model, P (E |M1) is distributed as uniformly as possi-
ble, such that its median is about one half. Thus for small
p-values the median coarse-grained posterior approximately
equals twice the p-value.
The second major cause of discrepancies between pos-
teriors and p-values is the so-called Occam effect [50]. The
evidence in eq. 12 may be thought of as the likelihood av-
eraged upon the prior. If the prior typically poorly predicts
the observed data by e.g., predicting signal strengths much
greater than favored by data, the evidence would be auto-
matically penalized by averaging, even if the prior permits a
signal strength that successfully predicts the observed data.
This means that the posterior for the signal model would
typically be reduced by broadening the prior range for e.g.,
the signal strength [51].
A. The Jeffreys-Lindley paradox
The Jeffreys-Lindley paradox [14, 22] demonstrates that a
posterior and a p-value could result in opposite conclusions
even in the asymptotic limit. The paradox results from the
fact that the posterior corresponding to a particular p-value
may depend on the sample size (i.e., integrated luminosity
in the context of collider physics) such that the disagreement
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Figure 2: Changes in the median posterior of the background (top) and global p-value (bottom) as the integrated luminosity
grows assuming the background only model (left) and the signal model with µ= 1 and mh = 125GeV (right). The band shows
an equal-tailed 68% interval. A random subset of MC realizations are shown with dashed lines. The p-value and posterior
corresponding to data observed by ATLAS (red stars) lie extremely close to zero in all cases.
between the posterior and p-value could diverge as the sam-
ple size increases. The paradox prompted questions about
the foundations of hypothesis testing; for commentary and
attempted resolutions, see e.g., ref. [14–21].
In the example of the paradox in ref. [21] we imagine n
Gaussian measurements of an unknown parameter, µ, with a
sample mean x¯ ∼N (µ,σ2/n). We consider two hypotheses:
the null H0 in which µ = 0 and an alternative H+ in which
µ ≥ 0. The sample mean is a sufficient statistic such that
evidence for the null is simply a Gaussian evaluated at µ= 0,
p (x¯ |H0)= p
(
x¯
∣∣µ= 0)= 1p
2pi
p
n
σ e
− 12χ2 , (21)
where χ2 = nx¯2/σ2 is the chi-squared. For the evidence for
the alternative model, we must average the likelihood upon
a prior for the unknown parameter, p
(
µ
)
,
p (x¯ |H+)=
∫
p
(
x¯
∣∣µ)p (µ) dµ
=
∫
1p
2pi
p
n
σ e
−n2 (x¯−µ)2/σ2 p
(
µ
)
dµ.
(22)
The Bayes factor is given by their ratio,
B+0 =
∫ 1p
2pi
p
n
σ e
−n2 (x¯−µ)2/σ2 p
(
µ
)
dµ
1p
2pi
p
n
σ e
− 12χ2
. (23)
As n grows the exponential term in the integrand becomes
sharply peaked at µ= x¯, such that we may make a Laplace
approximation resulting in
B+0 ≈ e
1
2χ
2
p
(
µ= x¯)p2piσp
n
. (24)
The p-value, on the other hand, depends only on the chi-
squared by p-value= 1−Φ(χ) for a one-sided test.
To create the paradox, we consider fixed chi-squared but
increasing sample size. If p
(
µ= x¯) is independent of n, from
eq. 24 we see that for fixed chi-squared the Bayes factor tends
to zero as the sample size increases. Thus, despite an arbi-
trarily small p-value, the Bayes factor could overwhelmingly
favor the null. To maintain a fixed chi-squared, however, the
sample mean must scale as x¯ =χσ/pn. This reflects the fact
as we accumulate data we are sensitive to smaller effects.
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Figure 3: Distributions of posterior of the background (top)
and global p-value (bottom) with 2.5/fb assuming the
background only model (green) and the background + signal
model with µ= 1 and mh = 125GeV (blue), which predicts
about 56 signal events.
V. RESULTS
A. Trajectories as we collect luminosity
We begin in fig. 2 by investigating the change in the p-value
and posterior of the background as the integrated luminosity
grows. First, we sampled data from the background only
model, performing 10 k pseudo-experiments at 50 luminosi-
ties between 10−3/fb and 107/fb. As we increased the lumi-
nosity, we added events to existing datasets, such that they
were correlated. At each luminosity, we found the median
and an equal-tailed 68% interval for the posterior of the back-
ground model and the p-value. We found that the posterior
increases monotonically from 0.5 to 1 as the luminosity in-
creases, with a narrow 68% interval (top left panel), i.e., as the
luminosity grows, the true model is increasingly favored. The
rate of convergence, however, is slow; it takes about 105/fb
before any strong preference for the background emerges.
The p-value, on the other hand, makes a random walk, with
a median of 0.5 regardless of the luminosity (bottom left
panel).
Second, we sampled data from the signal model assuming
a signal strength µ= 1 and a mass mh = 125GeV, performing
10 k pseudo-experiments at the same 50 luminosities. Sur-
prisingly, the posterior first increases from 0.5, before rapidly
decreasing to 0 once the luminosity exceeds about 10/fb (top
right panel). The initial increase in the posterior is, how-
ever, mild; the median reaches about 0.6, which shouldn’t be
considered worth more than a bare mention [22]. It occurs
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Figure 4: As in fig. 3 but with 25/fb. The background + signal
model predicts about 560 signal events.
because below about 10/fb Poisson fluctuations in the back-
ground of order
p
b provide an economical explanation of a
signal-like feature as s ≤–∼
p
b. The signal model isn’t strongly
rewarded as it cannot provide a much better fit to the data;
however, it is punished by the Occam effect as it wastes prior
probability at µÀ 1, which would typically result in signals
that were not observed. This results in a mild preference for
the background model. Above about 10/fb, fluctuations in
the background cannot explain a signal as s Àpb, and thus
the posterior of the background decreases to 0, as expected.
In other words, at large luminosities, the reward from a better
fit overcomes the Occam effect.
The p-value, on the other hand, decreases monotonically
to 0 (lower right panel) though within a substantial 68% in-
terval. As the signal and background models are similar at
small luminosities, the interval for the p-value at small lumi-
nosities is similar to that when the background model is true.
We show a random subset of MC realizations (dashed lines),
illustrating possible trajectories of the p-value and posterior.
B. Sampling properties of p-values and posteriors
We continue by performing 100 k pseudo-experiments un-
der the background only model and signal model assuming
a signal strength µ = 1 and a mass mh = 125GeV, at inte-
grated luminosities of 0.25/fb, 2.5/fb, 12.5/fb, 25/fb, 50/fb
and 250/fb, though this time the datasets are completely in-
dependent. In fig. 3 we show the resulting distributions of the
posterior and p-value at 2.5/fb. The posterior peaks at about
0.6 under the signal and background models, though under
the latter mildly greater posteriors are favored. Thus, even
7when the signal model is true, the posterior typically mildly
favors the background model. The explanation is identical
to that in sec. V A: below about 10/fb, a fluctuation in the
background can mimic the µ= 1 signal whereas the signal
model wastes prior probability at µÀ 1. The p-value on the
other hand is flat under the background distribution, but
peaks near 0 under the signal model, with a substantial tail
extending to 1. At 25/fb, shown in fig. 4, the posterior under
the background model peaks at about 0.75, with greater pref-
erence rare, and under the signal model, it peaks near 0, with
a moderate tail. The p-value of course remains flat under
the background distribution, but now sharply peaks near 0
under the signal model.
C. Type-1 errors and power
In fig. 5 we consider the type-1 error associated with the
posterior, i.e., if we placed a threshold on the posterior, what
is the type-1 error rate? We see that this depends on the
luminosity, though for all luminosities below posteriors of
about 0.5, the type-1 error rate is substantially less than the
posterior and the bound in eq. 15. Thus, although in the
Bayesian framework we relinquish direct control over the
type-1 error rate, we find no evidence that a threshold on the
posterior would lead to significant type-1 error rates in this
setting.7
In a similar manner, we investigated power — the proba-
bility of rejecting the background model when we generated
data from the signal model with µ= 1 and mh = 125GeV. We
show in fig. 6 that the ROC curves — the power versus the
type-1 error rate — were extremely similar for the log likeli-
hood ratio in eq. 4 and the posterior in eq. 14. They would
thus result in similar type-2 error rates for a fixed type-1
rate when used as test-statistics in a hypothesis test. This
is not surprising — it is consistent with the fact that we ob-
served an approximately monotonic relationship between
the posterior and log likelihood ratio in this setting and the
fact that error rates are invariant under strictly monotonic
transformations of the test-statistic.
D. The Bayes effect
In fig. 7, we contrast the results from Bayesian and fre-
quentist approaches. The ratios between the posterior of the
background only model and p-value are scattered against the
p-values from 100 k pseudo-experiments at 0.25/fb, 2.5/fb,
12.5/fb, 25/fb, 50/fb and 250/fb (blue points). We do not
find any significant differences in the relationship between
p-value and posterior at different luminosities and thus scat-
ter them together.8 The global p-values are significantly
7 We do not, however, necessarily recommend making a dichotomous deci-
sion, based on a threshold on the posterior or anything else.
8 One might, however, have anticipated a Jeffreys-Lindley-style paradox [14,
22]. The effect does not occur with a logarithmic prior; see sec. VII for
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Figure 5: Type-1 error associated with a threshold on the
posterior of the background only model for different
integrated luminosities (solid lines) and the upper bound in
eq. 15 (dashed line).
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likelihood ratio (dashed lines) as a test-statistic.
smaller than the associated posterior of the background
by about 100 – 1000 for p-values smaller than about 0.001.
Whilst both are extremely small, the global p-value from the
data observed by ATLAS is about 400 times smaller than the
posterior (red star). We furthermore show that the minimum
posterior obtainable with any priors for the Higgs mass and
signal strength lies slightly below the global p-value (green
points). We return to the issue of priors in sec. VI.
Lastly, we show the effect of conditioning only upon the
fact that the test-statistic was greater than the observed test-
statistic, eq. 17. This puts the exact experimental informa-
tion used in the calculation of the p-value into the Bayesian
one. We see that in this case the posteriors and p-values
(red points) are similar, suggesting that this — and not the
further discussion.
8Occam effect, prior information or differences in interpreta-
tion of probability — may be the fundamental origin of the
differences between the posteriors and p-values.
We convert posteriors and p-values to Z-values by the
one-tailed rule in eq. 11. In fig. 8 (top panel) we show the
difference between the global significance (i.e., the global
p-value converted to a Z-value) and the Bayesian signifi-
cance (i.e., the posterior of the background model converted
to a Z-value) as a function of the global significance. We call
this difference the Bayes effect, i.e.,
Bayes effect≡Global significance−Bayesian significance. (25)
This can be interpreted as a calibration of global signifi-
cances. For global significances greater than about 1σ the
Bayes effect is at least 1σ and peaks at over 2σ when the
global significance is about 2σ. Thus the Bayes effect means
that in the Bayesian framework global significances of about
2σ vanish and even global significances of 5σ, the discovery
threshold, reduce to about 4σ. The Bayes effect appears as
important as the look-elsewhere effect in resonance searches
(bottom panel) which reduces local significances by a similar
amount.9 We anticipated that the Bayes effect would be non-
zero as we knew that the posterior and p-value would not be
identical; however, we find the magnitude of the Bayes effect
interesting, as it could change our interpretation of anoma-
lies in resonance searches. There is spread in the Bayesian
significance as it is a function of the entire dataset and not
only the test-statistic. The Bayes effect occurs regardless
of whether data were generated from the background (dark
colors) or signal model (light colors) and at all luminosities
under consideration.
As discussed in sec. III, global p-values greater than 0.001
were calculated with a bootstrap technique and those smaller
than that were calculated with Gross-Vitells. A minor discrep-
ancy between the techniques is visible at the boundary at
p-value= 0.001 in fig. 7 (green points) and at Z-value≈ 3 in
fig. 8 (bottom panel). The discrepancy — about 1% in Z-value
— originates from Monte-Carlo errors in the bootstrap tech-
nique and asymptotic approximations in Gross-Vitells.
Finally, it is tempting but risky to assume that the mag-
nitude of the Bayes effect in this setting translates directly
to other tests of the SM. Although a general result — the
Vovk-Selke bound on the Bayes factor [52, 53] — indicates
that effects at least as great as 1σ could be common, its as-
sumptions may be violated in tests of the SM, as they are in
this one. Thus whilst we expect a similar effect in any test
of the SM and there might be some useful rules of thumb,
the actual result must be problem specific and requires a full
calculation. In this regard, the Bayes effect is similar to the
look-elsewhere effect.
9 Our numerical results are consistent with the fact that the ratio of the
global to local p-values — the trials factor — increases linearly with the lo-
cal significance. The apparent contradiction with the fact that the change
in significance decreases as the local significance increases stems from
the non-trivial conversion to Z-values.
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Figure 7: The ratio of the posterior of the background only
model to p-value scattered against the p-value (blue points).
We furthermore show the results corresponding to data
observed by ATLAS (red star), the minimum possible
posterior (green points) and that found by conditioning
upon only the fact that q ≥ qObserved (red points). Results
from data drawn from the background only model are
shown in darker colors.
VI. SENSITIVITY TOOURCHOICES OF PRIOR
The posterior of the background only model depends
upon choices of prior for the Higgs mass and signal strength.
To check whether the Bayes effect was an artifact of our par-
ticular choices, we repeated our calculations at 25/fb with
thirteen alternative choices of prior:
0. Our default choice; the priors described in sec. IV.
1. We halved the breadth of the prior for the logarithm of
the signal strength so that log10µ spanned −1 to 1.
2. We doubled the breadth of the prior for the logarithm
of the signal strength so that log10µ spanned −4 to 4.
3. We picked a logarithmic prior for the Higgs mass.
4. – 5. We picked a Gaussian prior for the order of magnitude
of the signal strength, centered at lnµ = 0. We made
two choices for the width, σlnµ = 1 and σlnµ = 4.
6. We picked a flat prior for the signal strength, µ= 0 – 2.
7. – 9. We picked a fat-tailed distribution, a Cauchy truncated
to allow only positive values, for the signal strength.
We centered it at µ= 1, representing prior knowledge
that µ≈ 1 and made two choices for the width, γ= 0.1
and γ= 0.5. We furthermore picked one representing
prior information that was faulty: µ= 0.5 with a width
γ= 0.1.
10. – 12. We picked a Gaussian prior for the Higgs mass, cen-
tered at mh = 125GeV. We made two choices for the
width, σ = 1GeV and σ = 10GeV. We again picked
one representing information that was faulty: mh =
140GeV with a width σ= 5GeV.
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Figure 8: The reduction in the global significance by the
Bayes effect (top panel) and the reduction in the local
significance by the look-elsewhere effect (bottom panel).
Results from data drawn from the background only model
are shown in darker colors.
13. Finally, we considered a prior representing accurate,
precise prior information about the mass and strength:
Gaussians centered at mh = 125GeV and µ = 1 with
widths 1GeV and 0.1, respectively.
The priors represented different possible states of knowledge
about the Higgs mass and coupling strength; from vague
knowledge, represented by broad priors, to specific informa-
tion about their likely values, represented by distributions
peaked at e.g., µ = 1 or mh = 125GeV. If we specified the
prior for only the Higgs mass or signal strength, we used the
choice of prior introduced in sec. IV for the other.
We show the resulting Bayes effects in fig. 9. We first con-
sider vague priors (green colors). The Bayes effect shows
mild dependence on the prior. For substantial global signifi-
cances the effect is stronger for broader priors, e.g., the effect
was biggest for a logarithmic prior on the signal strength be-
tween 10−4 and 104 (prior 2) and weakest for a log-normal
prior that favored a particular order of magnitude (prior 4)
and the flat prior (prior 6). This was anticipated as the ev-
idence for the signal model could be diluted by picking a
broader prior, enhancing the posterior of the background
model. Global significances of about 1 – 4σ, however, were
always reduced by at least about 1σ. As it was so similar to
the result from prior 0, we do not show the result for prior 3.
Second, we considered priors representing hypothetical
specific prior knowledge about the Higgs mass or signal
strength (red colors). In this case, the behavior depends
strongly on whether data was generated under the signal or
background model, since the latter may generate resonance-
like features that do not agree with our prior knowledge for
the mass and strength of the resonance. We find that for data
generated under the signal model, specific correct knowl-
edge reduces the Bayes effect, since it reduces the required
tuning. For data generated under the background model,
however, the Bayes effect could be amplified, as the poste-
rior of the background is enhanced if the anomaly is not in
accord with prior knowledge, regardless of its global signif-
icance. This resulted in substantial variation in the poste-
rior associated with a particular global significance (see e.g.,
prior 7 and prior 10).
If we had roughly known both the Higgs mass and signal
strength in advance (prior 13), there would be only a minor
Bayes effect under the signal model if the global significance
was greater than about 4σ. The Bayes effect could, however,
reduce global significances of about 2σ to nothing. Under
the background model, the Bayes effect was potentially dra-
matic, reducing global significances of less than about 3σ to
evidence against the signal model, though showed substan-
tial variance.
Finally, we consider specific but faulty prior information.
Under the signal model this enhances the posterior of the
background and thus the Bayes effect, since the prior infor-
mation conflicts with the observed resonance-like feature.
For the prior centered at mh = 140± 5GeV (prior 12), the
Bayes effect becomes dramatic, reducing global significances
of 5σ to about 3σ.
We summarize the prior sensitivity of the Bayes effect in
fig. 10. For the vague priors (top panel), the minimum and
maximum effects are typically separated by less than about
1σ. For moderate global significances, the Bayes effect al-
ways reduces the significance by at least about 0.5σ. For the
specific priors (bottom panel), the maximum effect is typi-
cally substantial, as specific information that conflicts with
data drastically reduces the significance. We stress, however,
that the minimum effect is typically greater than about 0σ;
negative Bayes effects that dramatically increase the signifi-
cance are impossible. This is consistent with the fact that the
minimum posterior achievable for any prior was only about
a factor four smaller than the global p-value (fig. 7).
VII. SENSITIVITY TO THE INTEGRATED LUMINOSITY AND
THE JEFFREYS-LINDLEY PARADOX
To investigate the paradox discussed in sec. IV A, we re-
peated our calculations at 0.25/fb, 2.5/fb, 12.5/fb, 25/fb,
50/fb and 250/fb for three of our choices of prior for the sig-
nal strength: our default choice (prior 0), a logarithmic prior
that favors no particular scale; a log-normal prior (prior 4),
which favors lnµ ' 0±1; and a flat prior between 0 and 2
(prior 6). In fig. 11 we show the Bayes effect as we increase
integrated luminosity for these three choices. We only con-
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Figure 9: Reduction in the global significance by the Bayes effect for several choices of vague prior (green colors) and specific
prior (red colors). We scatter data generated under the background model (dark) and the signal model (light) with 25/fb. The
number of the plot corresponds to the numbered list of priors in sec. VI.
sider data generated under the background only; we cannot
easily consider fixed significance under the signal model as
the significance increases as we increase luminosity. The log-
arithmic prior results in mild dependence on the luminosity.
The Bayes effect, however, shows strong dependence on the
luminosity for a log-normal and flat prior.
We can understand the absence of a paradox for a loga-
rithmic prior by reconsidering the canonical example. In
eq. 24, the Bayes factor’s explicit dependence on n cancels
for a logarithmic prior, p
(
µ
)∝ 1/µ, since it would result
in p
(
µ= x¯)∝pn. The fact that the Bayes factor no longer
explicitly depends on n is not surprising as the logarithmic
prior is invariant under changes of scale, and by considering
more data at fixed chi-squared we are probing smaller scales.
This result in fact holds exactly in eq. 23 as for a logarithmic
prior that equation is independent of n at fixed chi-squared,
which may be shown by rescaling the integration variable
µ→µ/pn and fixing the chi-squared by setting x¯ =χσ/pn.
There is though a residual dependence on scale as to en-
sure that it was proper the logarithmic prior spanned only
10−2 to 102. The limits of integration in eq. 23 thus rein-
troduce a dependence on scale, especially at small global
significances when the likelihood isn’t sharply peaked. In-
deed, at small global significances the Bayes effect mildly
increases with increasing luminosity, as the data disfavor an
increasingly greater fraction of the range 10−2 to 102. This
reduces the evidence for the signal model and thus increases
the Bayes effect.
The presence of the paradox for a log-normal prior stems
from the fact that it favors a particular magnitude, lnµ' 0.
The Bayes effect thus depends on the signal strength pre-
ferred by the global significance and luminosity — at fixed
significance, the preferred signal strength decreases with lu-
minosity; at fixed luminosity, it increases with significance.
Surprisingly though, the Bayes effect at 3σ appears as big
at 0.25/fb as at 250/fb. This occurs because in the former
case the preferred magnitude is greater than one, whereas
in the latter case it is less than one. Thus in both cases the
preferred signal strength conflicts with the prior resulting in
appreciable Bayes effects.
Relative to the logarithmic prior, the flat prior favors
greater orders of magnitude for the signal strength, p
(
lnµ
)∝
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Figure 10: Summary of prior sensitivity of the Bayes effect:
we show the maximum (brown) and minimum (blue) Bayes
effects found from our seven vague priors (top, green panels
of fig. 9) and our seven specific priors (bottom, red panels of
fig. 9).
µ. The presence of the paradox, therefore, is not surprising,
as at fixed chi-squared the data favors increasingly smaller
scales as the luminosity increases. With only 0.25/fb and
moderate global significances, the data favor signal strengths
greater than 2. The prior, however, only supports signal
strengths less than 2, resulting in substantial Bayes effects.
In summary, owing to the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox, the
Bayes effect depends on an interplay between the luminosity
and the prior. Since we are warning about the presence of
a substantial Bayes effect in this context, an effect that in-
creases it and makes it more unpredictable does not alter our
conclusions.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We compared Bayesian and frequentist approaches to res-
onance searches using toy experiments based on a Higgs
search in the diphoton channel. We first found two pedagog-
ical results. First, with increasing luminosity, we showed that
the Bayesian posterior always converges to overwhelming
favor the correct model, whereas the p-value makes a ran-
dom walk if the null is true, and otherwise converges to 0.
Second, we showed frequentist properties of the Bayesian
posterior, helping shed light on Bayesian results for those
with frequentist mindsets. We found that the type-1 error
rate from a threshold on the posterior, whilst not under di-
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Figure 11: The Bayes effect at several integrated luminosities
(indicated by different colors) for a logarithmic (top),
log-normal (middle) and flat (bottom) prior for the signal
strength. The number of the plot corresponds to the
numbered list of priors in sec. VI. The data were generated
under the background only model.
rect control, was significantly less than the threshold, i.e., if
we reject the background only model when the posterior is
less than 0.05, the type-1 error rate is significantly less than
0.05 in this setting. The ROC curves using the posterior and
log likelihood ratio as test-statistics were extremely similar.
Our final finding, however, was striking; in our canonical
resonance search toy problem, global significances were typ-
ically greater than those from our Bayesian framework by
about 1σ to 2σ, e.g., anomalies that appear at global signif-
icance of 3σ correspond to only about 1σ evidence in the
Bayesian framework. This effect — which we call the Bayes
effect — was robust with respect to seven vague choices of
priors for the mass and signal strength, though slightly de-
creased when the breadth of the prior was reduced. For our
seven choices representing specific prior knowledge about
the mass or strength, we found that the effect persisted,
12
though its magnitude strongly depended on whether the
prior information conflicted with the observed resonance-
like feature. For a logarithmic prior the effect depended
extremely mildly upon the integrated luminosity, though
for other priors a Jeffreys-Lindley paradox was observed, as
anticipated.
We showed that when we discarded information, and
worked assuming that we only knew that the test-statistic was
at least as big as a threshold, we found similar results from
Bayesian and frequentist methods. This suggests that the
Bayes effect originates from the fact that p-values use only
the fact that the test-statistic was at least as big as that ob-
served, whereas the posterior uses the exact observed data.
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